This article begins by outlining some of the history-beginning with brief remarks of Quine's-of work on conditional assertions and conditional events. The upshot of the historical narrative is that diverse works from various starting points have circled around a nexus of ideas without convincingly tying them together. Section 3 shows how ideas contained in a neglected article of de Finetti's lead to a unified treatment of the topics based on the identification of conditional events as the objects of conditional bets. The penultimate section explores some of the consequences of the resulting logic of conditional events while the last defends it.
Introduction
A conditional assertion is not a single proposition asserted in a single act of utterance or inscription. Rather, by making a certain utterance or inscription one undertakes to be committed to a proposition, in the way one standardly is committed to propositions by one's assertions, should some condition be fulfilled. A conditional assertion essentially involves two, not necessarily distinct, propositions, one specifying the condition, fulfilment of which then leads to the second being taken as asserted. When the condition is fulfilled the conditional assertion is true or false as the second proposition is true or false, but it is neither true nor false unless that condition is fulfilled. That the indicative conditionals of natural language might best be seen not as expressing single propositions but as conditional assertions seems to have been first suggested in print by Quine, although it was not a thesis to which he himself was committed.
A conditional event is similar to a conditional assertion: it is an event that is only properly said to occur or to fail to occur when a certain condition is fulfilled. Unless the condition is fulfilled the question of occurrence or failure to occur does not arise. Formally, if we give events the set-theoretic form common in probability theory, a conditional event is defined only on part of the sample space. Conditional events arise naturally in the context of conditional bets: a conditional bet goes ahead only if some condition is satisfied, otherwise it is cancelled without loss to either party. We can think of a conditional bet as a bet on a conditional event.
Bruno de Finetti identified conditional probabilities as the fair betting quotients for conditional bets (de Finetti [1937] ). We are thus led to a plausible identification of the probability of a conditional event with the corresponding conditional probability. This can, of course, be extended to probabilities assigned conditional assertions, just as it is commonplace in certain contexts to take propositions rather than events to be the bearers of probabilities.
Conditional assertions and conditional events are not, by their very nature, ordinary propositions and events. If we are to identify their probabilities with conditional probabilities then one way to read David Lewis's triviality results (Lewis [1976] ) is as telling us that conditional assertions/events cannot be identified with any subclass of ordinary propositions/events, i.e., no ordinary propositions/events can go proxy for conditional assertions/events; nor, in virtue of the same results, can we suppose conditional assertions/events both to inherit the same classical/boolean logico-algebraic structure and to satisfy the same probability calculus as ordinary assertions/events, for Lewis's results would just carry over. Thus much effort has been concentrated on finding appropriate logico-algebraic structure, giving rise to the discipline now known as conditional event algebra.
This article charts the history of some of these developments. From diverse starting points there has been convergence towards a group of ideas, a convergence which has.not yet resulted in a convincing synthesis. The third section goes back to articles of de Finetti's from 1935 to find the unifying perspective that makes the needed connections. The penultimate section explores some aspects of the resulting theory. Since some of these are perhaps counter-intuitive the final section offers a defence. Now under what circumstances is a conditional true? Even to raise this question is to depart from everyday attitudes. An affirmation of the form 'if A then B' is commonly felt less as an affirmation of a conditional than as a conditional affirmation of the consequent. If, after we have made such an affirmation, the antecedent turns out true, then we consider ourselves committed to the consequent, and are ready to acknowledge error if it proves false. If, on the other hand the antecedent turns out to have been false, our conditional affirmation is as if it had never been made. 1 And there Quine left it.
The idea of conditional assertion or conditional affirmation may have an earlier source than Rhinelander, or it may, perhaps, have been 'in the air'. Certainly, in a 1953 article in Mind Wilfrid Sellars invokes it without further explanation and without reference to sources (but note that Sellars is not here concerned with the analysis of indicative conditionals):
What, then does it mean to say of one sentence, B, that it is derivable from another, A? Roughly, that it is permissible to assert B, given that one has asserted A, whereas it is not permissible to assert not-fi, given that one has asserted A. In other words, we have here a rule of conditional assertion (which must not be confused with a rule for the assertion of a conditional). 2 Sellars is, of course, right to say that a conditional assertion is not be confused with the assertion of a conditional, but the novelty in Rhinelander's suggestion is exactly that the utterance of an indicative of the form 'if A then B' is to be understood as a conditional assertion and not the assertion of a single conditional proposition.
Von Wright advocated a somewhat similar line on conditionals in the late 1950s. As part of a careful analysis of asserting von Wright tells us:
One may say that when someone asserts B conditionally, relative to A, he licenses others to take him as having asserted B, //the condition A is found to be, in fact, fulfilled.
condition A] and A is false ..., then B is neither truly nor falsely asserted on the condition A. 4 But von Wright makes little attempt to elaborate the logic of such conditional assertions and none to relate them to conditional probability. For that we must await Ernest Adams' seminal 'The Logic of Conditionals', published in 1965. In the interim we turn to Michael Dummett's 1959 article 'Truth'. In this article Dummett attempted to drive a wedge between conditional bets and conditional assertions: the former are legitimate and well understood, the latter have no use. A conditional bet, as we said above, goes ahead only if some condition is satisfied, otherwise it is cancelled without loss to either party; according to Ramsey, such bets were common in the eighteenth century.
5 Thus a bet on B conditional on A is cancelled if A fails to occur, and is otherwise won or lost as B occurs or not. For Dummett the mismatch between conditional bets and conditional assertions comes about because, in the case of assertions, in the presence of what purport to be truth-values other than truth and falsity, the important distinction is usually between designated and undesignated truthvalues, gradations within designated and undesignated values only being important for the truth-functional characterization of connectives. 6 Provided we do not count a speaker as having misled her audience by uttering a conditional with an antecedent she believes may be false-and Dummett contends that we do not-there is no point to classifying her utterance as neither true nor false rather than true when the antecedent is indeed false. On the other hand, winning and failing to lose a conditional bet are distinct, and quite properly so. 7 Dummett observes that in the .case of sentences containing non-denoting singular terms our intuitions concerning misleading assertions go the other way: it is misleading to utter such a sentence when believing the term may fail to refer; hence it ought to be counted false rather than neither true nor false, as Frege and Strawson maintained.
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Nuel Belnap and Ruth Manor were later to take up the point that the sort of presupposition that is involved in making a conditional assertion is distinct from that championed by Strawson. Roughly, in asserting a sentence one makes a commitment to (the truth of) its Strawsonian presuppositions while in making a conditional assertion one is not committed to the truth of the 4 Ibid., pp. 135-6. Von Wright's account is complicated by his proposal that in asserting B on the condition A, (1) one asserts categorically the material implication AziB, and (2) one neither asserts nor denies either the antecedent or the consequent. With these provisos in place we can say further: that B is truly asserted on the condition A if it is asserted on the condition A and A and B are both true; and that B is falsely asserted on the condition A if it is asserted on the condition A and A is true but B is false (loc. cit.). 5 Ramsey [1926] , p. 40. 6 Dummett [1959] , pp. 12-14. Dummett has reaffirmed this view more recently; see his [1991], pp. 33-4 and 305-5. Idem [1959] Ibid., p. 12. 
Adams
In 'The Logic of Conditionals' Adams was certainly aware of the conditional assertion approach to conditionals. Considering justifiability of bets as an indicator of justifiability of assertion (modulo obvious qualifications), he says:
For many conditional statements, the conditions of settling bets on them are just as clear as they are on particular non-conditional statements. Normally, bets on conditional statements are considered to be themselves conditional: for instance, a bet on the statement 'If John does not arrive on the 10 o'clock plane, he will arrive on the 11 o'clock plane' is conditional on John's not arriving on the 10 o'clock plane. More generally, a bet that 'if A then B' is conditional-in force only if A proves true, and in that case winning if B is true, and losing if B is false.
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In a footnote he observes:
In connecting conditional statements with conditional bets we are doing something akin to what Quine [1950] has suggested: that is to regard conditional statements as having truth values only in case their antecedents are true. On this view, conditional statements might more properly be described as statements made conditionally, the condition being that the antecedent be true, and the consequent being what is asserted subject to that condition. Seen in this way, nothing is asserted in case the antecedent is not 'fulfilled', just as nothing is bet (i.e. the bet is called off) in case its conditions are not fulfilled in a conditional bet, and in a conditional promise nothing is promised in case its conditions are not met.'' Adams makes little capital out of this. Having linked conditionals to conditional bets, he does suggest-tentatively-that 'a conditional bet is justified in case it is much more likely to be won than lost (though it may be more likely still to be called off) '. 12 Presumably it is this thought 13 -no other explanation 9 Belnap [1973], p. 70 and Manor [1975] , p. 145. Cf. Corcoran [1973] , p. 93, n. 5. 10 Adams [1965], p. 175. " Ibid., n. 4, p. 196. n Ibid., p. 175. 13 This is borne out by Adams [1996] , p. 267: 'the conditional probability of the statement 'if A then B' can easily be seen to be high just in case it is much more likely that A and B are both true than that/4 is true and B is false. But this condition is quite different from one requiring that the probability of the statement 'if A then B' is true ... is high.
is given-that leads him, in his formal treatment, to make the identification that has become known as Adams' Principled the probability of a simple conditional is the conditional probability of its consequent given its antecedent (and is 1 where the antecedent receives zero probability). Here a simple conditional is one whose antecedent and consequent contain at most the familiar truth-functional conjunction, disjunction, and negation. Adams' formal language disallows compounding of conditionals (with either other conditionals or truth-functional formulas). 15 The reasons he gives are as follows. Negation: 'the ordinary meaning of the denial "it is not the case that if A then B" is just to assert "if A then not B" ' so 'there is little point' in including them in the formalism for, by this very equivalence, the latter can always replace the former. conditions for the settling of a single bet on the conjunction.' In 'Probability and the Logic of Conditionals', Adams' more formal article of the following year, a different reason for the absence of compounds of conditionals is given:
'The general reason for imposing this limitation is to insure that all formulas of the language can have probabilities assigned to them which obey the axioms of the standard calculus of conditional probability, which does not apply in its usual form to compound expressions with conditional components.
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This prescient-but unargued-claim is matched by another. Tn both articles Adams made use of a high-probability criterion for reasonable consequence (validity of inference) involving conditionals:
for every e > 0 there is a 8 > 0 such that, under every probability distribution, if the premises all have probability greater than 1 -5 then the conclusion has probability greater than 1 -e. 20 Adams proves a number of results, including his Theorem 9.5. Of it he says:
The principle significance of Theorem 9.5 is to show that in deriving reasonable inferences from non-redundant premises, one can replace the set of premises ... by a single conditional premise. In a sense, this suggests that one might introduce a kind of 'quasi-conjunction' operation applying to conditionals. Adams [1966] , p. 270. 20 Adams [1965], pp. 185-6; [ 1966] , p. 274. Notice that the choice of 5 depends on both e and the inference in question. 21 Idem [1966] , p. 306.
(truth-functional) propositions:
where the left-most occurrence of '&', standing between conditionals, is the quasi-conjunction. Adams went on to say:
One can ... show easily that quasi-conjunction reduces to ordinary conjunction in case both B\A and D\ C are truth functional [i.e. A and C are both arbitrary truth-functional tautologies]. On the other hand, this is not a true conjunction operation because in general neither B \ A nor D \ C is a reasonable consequence of (B\A)&(D\C). In fact, Theorem 9.5 entails directly that no such 'true' conjunction operation is definable within this calculus ... It seems to me that this result somewhat confirms our intuitions about conditionals: namely that the joint assertion of two conditionals is not the same as, and cannot be paraphrased as the assertion of a single conditional.
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By way of a final remark on Adams' two papers, we should note that although Adams does not endorse the conditional assertion account of conditional statements he does use it. In both papers he introduces verification and falsification: a truth-functional formula is verified if it is true, falsified if it is false; a conditional is verified if antecedent and consequent are both true, falsified if antecedent is true and consequent false, otherwise neither. A bet on a statement is won when the statement is verified, lost when it is falsified. Adams next defines a notion of entailment-strong entailment-in terms of verification and falsification: premises strongly entail a conclusion if when the conclusion is falsified so is at least one of the premises, i.e. a bet on the conclusion cannot be lost without losing a bet on at least one of the premises, and if any of the premises is verified and none falsified then the conclusion is also verified, i.e. if one wins the bet on at least one premise and loses on none of the others then one wins the bet on the conclusion too. In Adams [1965] he stated and in his [1966] he proved that a conclusion is a reasonable consequence (under the high probability criterion of validity) of a set of premises just in case some subset of the premises strongly entails the conclusion. Adams [1965], p. 188; [1966] , pp. 297-9. 24 Goodman, Nguyen, and Walker, [1991] , p. 36, concur: 'Schay became apparently the first to attempt a full calculus of operations among conditionals, especially among those with different antecedents.'
phrase 'the probability of 6 given A' where conditional probabilities are concerned:
In the usual definition of conditional probabilities the 'probability of B given A' should be interpreted as ' (probability of B) given A' rather than as 'the probability of (B given A) since the notion 'B given A' is not defined. While the usual notation P(B\A) obscures this, and in fact suggests the latter erroneous interpretation, the notation P&{B) ... shows the correct meaning very clearly. Evidently by 'when we say ... we imply' Schay means that A must be true for B\A to be true. Schay went on to define two algebraic analogues each of intersection and union, and an analogue of complementation, for conditional events-thus creating an algebra of conditional events-and to prove a number of theorems, including a counterpart to the Stone Representation Theorem for boolean algebras. But for the unargued claim that three of his operations 'correspond to the usual meaning of the words "or", "and" and "not" ' 29 Schay might have conjured them out of thin air (which is not to say that adequate justifications for them cannot be found). Moreover, despite the explicitly stated motivation for his inquiry, only towards the end of his article does he briefly discuss probability: a probability distribution P over the original boolean algebra is extended to the algebra of conditional events by the identity promised a more extensive treatment of probabilities of conditional events in another article (of which I have discerned no trace). Now, the analogue of intersection of which Schay said that it corresponds to the usual meaning of 'and' turns out to be equivalent to Adams quasiconjunction. We therefore know from what Adams said about the unobtainability of a true conjunction that this quasi-conjunction may have a probability higher than one of its conjuncts. Schay himself points out that it can happen that the probability of the quasi-conjunction may be non-zero while a conjunct has zero probability. ' The reappearance of Adams' quasi-conjunction is perhaps surprising; the claim that it corresponds to the usual meaning of 'and' is certainly so.
Belnap, Lewis, van Fraassen
Published in a place unlikely to attract the attention of either logicians or probabilists of foundational bent-the Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications-Schay's article seems to have attracted little attention. Certainly, our historical narrative now heads in a quite different direction: geographically to Pittsburgh and to a brief flurry of activity concerning conditional assertion on the Quine-Rhinelander model that produced formal and philosophical discussions from Belnap, Manor, and Belnap [1973] , Manor [1975] , and the works cited in Cohen [1992] . 33 Belnap, op. cit., p. 61. next historical highlight. Since the material is well known, I can be brief. What Lewis and later, stronger, results showed, is that there is no way to introduce into a language containing the familiar classical connectives a further connective '=>' so that for any pair of sentences A and C of the language it is the case that
for any probability distribution belonging a class of distributions closed under fairly weak constraints.
4
A close variant of Lewis's original Triviality Theorem can be derived from these two premises:
5
(1) P is a function defined on the sentences ofL that obeys the standard laws of probability and that sets P(A => C) = P(A&C)IP{A) whenever P{A) * 0. (2) If P(B) # 0, then the function P B got by setting P B (c/>) equal to P(B&4>)/P(B) satisfies the standard laws of probability and the condition that
Here A and B range over sentences of L containing no occurrences of '=>' -what Adams calls truth-functional sentences-whereas <j> can be any sentence of the language. To avoid needless complexity we may suppose that only =>-free sentences can be the antecedents of =>-conditionals. Premise (2) maintains that the class of probability distributions to which (1) applies is closed under conditionalization on =>-free sentences. The identification of conditional probabilities with probabilities of conditionals holds only for simple conditionals, conditionals with =>-free antecedents and consequents. It suffices to yield a version of Lewis's Theorem: 36 if P(A&C) > 0 and P(A&-~C) > 0 then A and C are probabilistically independent under P. From here one can go on to show that P assumes at most four values on =*-free sentences of L 37 and that P B is two-valued on =>-free sentences whenO < P(B) < 1.
Lewis's proof relies on the identification of P C (A => C) with P C (A&C)/P C (A), where, by definition, P C (B) = P(B&C)/P(C) (and similarly for P^c(A => C)). Van McGee rejects this identification in rejecting the
34 In Lewis's original proof (Lewis [1976] ) the weak constraint is closure under formation of distributions by conditionalization. In subsequent work by Lewis and others the constraint is considerably further weakened. See , the articles by Alan Hajek, Ned Hall, and Hajek and Hall in Eells and Skyrms (eds) [1994] , and Hajek [1996] . That the other connectives must be close to classical for the Lewis derivation to go through is shown in Morgan and Manes [1995] . 35 The presentation here is based on McGee [1989], pp. 488-9. 36 Cf. Edgington [1991], p. 197. 37 Cf. McGee, loc. cit., and Lewis, op. cit. If we add to Lewis's assumptions McGee's stipulation that P(A => C) = 1 when P(A) = 0 then we find that P takes only the values 0 and 1 on all sentences of£ and that the conditionals are therefore material implications; see Milne [1996] , Theorem 1, pp. 126-7.
application of Adams' Principle to other than simple conditionals, for in place of (2) above he stipulates that P B (<f>) = P(B => 0). 38 Another course is suggested by Lewis's own observations on how the implications of his results might be avoided by Adams.
[Adams] does not claim that the so-called 'probabilities' of conditionals are probabilities of truth, and neither does he claim that they obey the standard laws of probability. They are probabilities only in name. Adams's position is therefore invulnerable to my triviality results, which are proven by applying standard laws of probability to the probabilities of conditionals ... Merely to deny that probabilities of conditionals are probabilities of truth, while retaining all the standard laws of probability in suitably adapted form, would not yet make it safe to revive the thesis that probabilities of conditionals are conditional probabilities. It was not the connection between truth and probability that led to my triviality results, but only the application of standard probability theory to the probabilities of conditionals ... Whoever still wants to say that probabilities of conditionals are conditional probabilities had better also employ a non-standard calculus of 'probabilities'. He might drop the requirement that the domain of a probability function is a Boolean algebra, in order to exclude conjunctions with conditional conjuncts from the language. Or he might instead limit the law of additivity, refusing to apply it when the disjuncts A and B contain conditional conjuncts. Either manoeuvre would block my proofs. But if it be granted that the 'probabilities' of conditionals do not obey the standard laws, I do not see what is to be gained by insisting on calling them 'probabilities'.
39
We shall return to the challenge implicit in the final sentence shortly. But first, another neglected signpost. One of the Pittsburgh authors on conditional assertion was Bas van Fraassen. In a subsequent paper, 'Gentlemen's Wagers: Relevant Logic and Probability', he introduced a betting arrangement according to which no money changes hands until events settling the bet have taken place-a gentleman's wager. A gentleman's wager on a statement A is won if events settling the bet positively occur, lost if events settling it negatively occur, and otherwise remains unsettled. In outline, associated with each statement A we have two closed classes of events: A + , the class of events forcing settlement favourable to A, and A~, the class of events forcing settlement against A. A closed class of events is one that contains any event forcing the occurrence of any member of the class. For each atomic statement A, there are incompatible events a + and a~ such that every event in A + forces a + and every event in A~ forces a~.
Logical connectives for statements are introduced by rules for settlement of bets: 
Conditional event algebra
The escape route evading his own triviality results that Lewis indicated was taken by a small handful of authors working in modelling uncertainty, work belonging, under the artificial divisions of academic life, to artificial intelligence or computer science rather than philosophy or logic. In response, on the one hand, to the desire to give formal, mathematical expression to information in expert systems that is both given in conditional form and uncertain, and, on the other, aware of the mismatch between conditional probability and probabilities of material conditionals, these authors either rediscovered or independently recreated the work of Schay in the mid-to late-1980s. In this context the phrase measure-free conditioning arose: the aim, much as Schay's had been, was the introduction of conditional objects whose role it is to be the '£ given A' 's of conditional probability, to be, as I shall say perhaps a little inaccurately, the bearers of conditional probabilities. The work of Philip Calabrese and of Irwin Goodman and Hung Nguyen is of particular importance.
41 Didier Dubois and Henri Prade explain it thus:
There are basically two ways of modelling 'if ... then' rules in artificial intelligence: (1) material implication in theorem proving and logic programming and (2) production rules in expert system shells ... [I] t is well known that material implication is a debatable tool for translating if-then statements. Namely, [the material implication] ->A V B is considered true when A is false, while a production rule 'if A then B' is not applicable in that case ... Another problem occurs when rules are pervaded with uncertainty and are assigned numbers such as probability values. It is then interesting to note that logicians and statisticians split into two groups: Logicians interpret these numbers as the probability of the material implication ... whereas statisticians use conditional probabilities. There has been some work in the past to define the measure free symbol B \ A in the framework of modal logic (especially Stalnaker [1968] ). However, the attempts to properly relate B\A and P(B/A) have been unsuccessful with this approach (e.g. Lewis [1976] , Harper et al. [1981] Starting from a boolean algebra B, Calabrese and Goodman and Nguyen identify the conditional object 'B given A' with a subset of the domain of B. Since I shall need later to distinguish such subsets from conditional objects otherwise construed, I shall use B: A for the subset playing the part of 'B given A': B: A is the 'interval' set {C £ B.A&B «Cs-/lvB), where =£ is the partial order on B determined by (among various possible equivalent conditions) A =S B iff A&B = A. 41 This work is surveyed in Dubois and Prade [1990] , and, in greater detail, in Goodman, Nguyen and Walker [1991] , in Dubois, Goodman and Calabrese (guest eds) [1994] and in Goodman and Nguyen [1995] . Signal as Calabrese's contribution has been, he is perhaps not the finest expositor of his own ideas: '[I]n a logic with only two truth values-always true or always false, necessary or impossible, one or zero-there is still the well-recognized truth-table anomaly in which, according to material implication, "if A then B" is true whenever A is false ... By contrast, in probability, if A is false, then the probability of A is zero and so the conditional probability ratio, P(A&B)/P(A), is undefined' (Calabrese [1987] , p. 190); '[T]he truth value of the material conditional (B V ~A) is certainly valid when A is true' (ibid., p. 201). 42 Dubois and Prade [1990] , pp. 24-5.
B:
A is the equivalence class of B in the quotient boolean algebra generated by the principal filter generated by A, i.e. B:A=(CG B:A&C = A&B}. It is also the intersection of the filter generated by A&B and the ideal generated by -•A V B (which is, in turn, the ideal dual to the filter generated by A&^B), In logical terms this may be thought of as the equivalence class of the proposition B in the Lindenbaum algebra generated by the theory axiomatized by A, i.e. The tricky task is to find appropriate extensions of these operations so that one may, in some sense, conjoin and disjoin conditional objects with distinct conditioning events (antecedents). Calabrese makes stipulations that exactly match the three operations of which Schay claimed correspondence to the usual meaning of the words 'or', 'and' and 'not' (so Adams' quasi-conjunction makes a return). Goodman and Nguyen say:
With all due credit to the pioneering work in Calabrese [1987] , the thrust of the approach taken in this paper to conditional objects, rather than appealing to intuition or analogues with other concepts (such as the logical implication), is to derive from first principles as many results as possible. One justification for considering the basic component-wise (or power class) extension of operations over [the original boolean algebra to conditional objects] is that these extensions can be shown to be well-defined and to extend in a natural sense corresponding coset operations for fixed common antecedents of conditional objects. 43 Cf. Bell and Machover [1977] , pp. 133-5 and 191-3. Calabrese and Goodman and Nguyen prefer to talk of cosets of ideals but it all amounts to the same thing. 44 Goodman and Nguyen [1988], p. 127. which is perhaps most easily seen using the propositional identity
We shall have more to say about these particular operations shortly. For now, we should note that both Calabrese and Goodman and Nguyen advance beyond Schay in permitting iterated conditional objects. Dubois and Prade opine that: it is interesting to iterate the conditioning process in such a way that B | B remains closed under the process 45 but omit to tell us why. Calabrese does a little better:
One of the most frequently used compound conditionals is the familiar mathematical construction:
That is, ((C : B) : A). Intuitively, this just means
'if (A and B) then C". That is, (C : B&A). But this is not so easy to prove 46 (although it is unclear what this has to do with quotient algebras unless the latter are seriously thought of as semantic models for the conditionals of natural language). In fact it is impossible to prove the indicated identity, although it can be motivated. C: B is the equivalence class of C in the quotient algebra B/[B) generated from the original algebra B by the principal filter generated by B; starting next from the quotient algebra B/[B) one can consider the equivalence class of C : B in the quotient algebra generated from B/[B) by the principal filter generated by A : B. Call this set (C : B) : A. We should observe that from the quotient algebra perspective there is no obvious rationale for seeking to define iterated conditional events within B | B: the conditional events belong B | B, not B; on the other hand it is the elements of the original algebra B that are taken in pairs and mapped to equivalence classes in the quotient algebra. Goodman and Nguyen's iterated conditionals do not belong B|B; they use the logico-algebraic structure introduced in B|B to define 'higher-order' conditionals belonging yet another domain.
Iterated conditionals apart, two questions press upon us. What, in the quotient algebra/coset approach to conditional events, motivates setting P(B : A) = P(B/A)1 Of course, the aim has been to find objects that can play exactly this role, but their introduction lacks any heuristic motivation. It is true that, for any C in B : A, P(CIA) = P(B/A), but that hardly justifies the 'transfer' of probability from B to B|B. Secondly, we face Lewis's challenge.
If, as it were, we go looking for objects to play the role of 'B given A', for arbitrary A and B in some boolean algebra, then a result of Goodman, Nguyen and Walker's may seem, at first sight, to help out. They show that if we assume, where A, B, C, and D are arbitrary elements of a boolean algebra with greatest element 1 and least element 0, and | is some function on pairs of elements of B, this result Goodman, Nguyen, and Walker speak of being 'led to a canonical form for conditional events'. 49 We can let the expression 'canonical form' pass if we read this result in the spirit of a representation theorem. It demonstrates at most the consistency of treating conditional events as cosets of ideals and of assigning probabilities to them in accordance with the fifth assumption, although this is no small matter. That probabilities can be so assigned seems to have been first recognized by Stefan Mazurkiewicz (recognition made public in the posthumously published Mazurkiewicz [1956] ). We have, in fact, been given no compelling reason why we ought to extend a probability distribution on a boolean algebra so that cosets of ideals generated by elements of the algebra become the bearers of conditional probabilities. As Elbert Walker says: '[TJhinking of a conditional event as a coset of a principal idea of a Boolean ring is not the most natural thing to do.'
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The conditional events in B | B being paired one-to-one with pairs of items in the original boolean algebra B, there can be no formal difficulty in assigning B : A the value P(B/A). On the other hand, the ordinary event/proposition A can be identified with the conditional object A : T, where 'T' is any classical tautology and we have given B|B structure in adding the logico-algebraic operations. Now, if the structure were sufficiently boolean-like and the assigned values behaved sufficiently like probabilities do in the boolean setting (with respect to the introduced operations), we could then just carry over Lewis's proofs of his triviality results to the new setting. Hence, exactly because there is no problem in assigning B : A the value P(BIA), contraposing the Lewis argument tells us that either the logico-algebraic structure is nonclassical (non-boolean) or the assigned values do not behave as probabilities do in the boolean setting-or both. But that being the case, Lewis's challenge bites: why should we think of these assigned values as probabilities?
Here a return to conditional assertions might help out. Dorothy Edgington characterizes conditional assertions in the now familiar way:
A conditional assertion 'If A, B' is an assertion of B when A is true, and an assertion of nothing when A is false. It is natural then to say my conditional assertion is true if A and B are both true, and false if A is true and B is not, and has no truth value when A is false.
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Closely allied to conditional assertion is conditional belief. Edgington again:
Belief that if A, B is a conditional belief that it is true given that it has a truth value-belief that it is true given that it is either true or false. Now my degree of belief that 'If A, B' is true, given that it has a truth value, is just P(A&B)/P(A), as it should be.
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We obtain what Edgington calls The Thesis: P(ifA,B) = P(A&B)/P(A). 53 She is not quite explicit on the range of the Thesis but appears to consider only simple conditional assertions in her discussion of conditional assertion and conditional belief. Elsewhere she says that it seems that we treat conditionals of the form 'If A, then if B then C, as interchangeable with conditionals of the form 'If A and B, then C'. 54 No matter. What the just-quoted passage does is
give us a reason to identify probabilities/degrees-of-belief in conditional assertions with conditional probabilities. Unfortunately, at the same time as pointing in the direction of an answer to Lewis's challenge, Edgington writes off any attempt to inform the class of conditional assertions with logicoalgebraic structure:
The true/false/neither classification does not yield an interesting 3-valued logic or a promising treatment of compounds of conditionals ... explaining her judgement with the aside:
for it is not a case of there being some 'designated' value or values. We shall have more to say on this below. For now our story has reached 1995: time to draw the lessons of history.
In hindsight the failings of disunity stand starkly revealed: mathematically sophisticated treatments of conditional events that impose logico-algebraic structure but leave one wondering just why they ought to be, as their creators intend them to be, the bearers of conditional probabilities; philosophicolinguistic studies that, pace Dummett, give well-motivated accounts of conditional assertions, their semantics, their pragmatics, and even their proof theory but, until very recently, no hint that there might be an interesting argument for taking their probabilities (albeit construed as degrees of belief) to be conditional probabilities; van Fraassen's promising paper presumably lost in the relevance logic ghetto; and perhaps worst of all, a tendency either to miss, or at least miss the significance of, the most natural equation of all: the identification of bets on conditional assertions with conditional bets. But much, much sadder than this dismal spectacle is the fact that Bruno de Finetti had laid the foundations for a unified treatment in 1935.
3 Paris, 1935 3.1 Three-valued logic
The theory of conditional events begins with Bruno de Finetti's 'La logique de la probabilite', his contribution to the International Congress of Scientific Philosophy held in Paris in 1935. This short conference address, together with the lectures he gave in Paris earlier that year in May, subsequently published as the renowned 'La prevision: ses lois logiques, ses sources subjectives', provide the foundations for a unified treatment of conditional events. 56 
Conditional assertions or conditional events are introduced by de Finetti under the name tri-events (trievenements):
A and B being any two events (propositions) we shall call tri-event B \A (B conditional on A) the logical entity held to be: firstly, true if A and B are true: secondly./a/se if B is false and A is true; thirdly, void if A is false.
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In according de Finetti' s work the role of fans et origo I do not intend to slight the work of Boole, later developed by Theodore Hailperin in his [1976/86] and briefly dealt with in the editors' introduction and the contribution by Hung Nguyen and Elbert Walker to Dubois, Goodman, and Calabrese (guest eds) [1994] . But absent in Boole's work and in Hailperin's development of it is the application of logico-algebraic operations to conditional events with different antecedents. The same is true of other pioneers of the coset approach such as B.O. Koopman, Stefan Mazurkiewicz, Jan Pfanzagl, and Zoltan Domotor; see Goodman, Nguyen and Walker [1991] , pp. 33-5, for details and references. 57 , p. 35. Henry Kyburg mentions 'tri-event' for 'trievenemenf but prefers 'conditional event' in his translation of de Finetti [1937] ; I shall follow him in this, as also-as here-in using 'void' for 'nulle' and 'conditional on' for 'subordonne a'.
(Throughout his paper de Finetti skips blithely between talk of propositions and talk of events.) As he notes, an ordinary event A can be identified with the conditional event A | T (where T is any tautology of two-valued logic). Next de Finetti produces a three-valued logic that prescribes truth-values for compounds of conditional events. His matrices for conjunction, disjunction, negation, and an ordinary propositional conditional are those of Kleene's strong three-valued semantics (which coincides with the well-known Lukasiewicz three-valued logic on negation, conjunction, and disjunction). De Finetti does not explain how he arrived at them. He says only that the three-valued logic can be developed in strict analogy with two-valued logic (and this is possible precisely because conditional events are nothing more than formal representations of pairs of ordinary events).
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As a consequence of his specifications, the logical compounds of conditional events are themselves conditional events. De Finetti does not, however, indicate which conditional events. Abbreviating 'the event B conditional on the event A' by B\A we find, where A, B, C and D are ordinary events/ propositions:
(B\A)&(D| C) « (A&B&C&D)|((A&^B) V (A&C) V (C&-D)); (B | A) V (D | C) « (B V D) | ((A&B) V (A&C) V (C&D)).
These are, exactly, the identities that Goodman and Nguyen were to rediscover (by another route); they are also van Fraassen's connectives when applied to conditional events of the form A + |(A + uA"). Here '«' means 'has the same (three-valued) truth- 
written ((-•A V B)V (-C V D)) | ((A&B) V (A&C) V (C&D)) for (B \ A) V (D \ C)
, thereby making the satisfaction of De Morgan's laws more transparent. (Since it would be convenient to think of an ordinary event A giving rise to exactly one corresponding conditional event A | T, it might be better to think of the expressions 'B\A' standing not as propositions of some language but for the equivalence class of such expressions under the relation =.) How did de Finetti arrive at his truth-tables? There are, I think only two possibilities. One has him developing three-valued logic in, as he says, strict analogy with two-valued logic. For example, one could just take over from two-valued logic the idea that a conjunction is true just when both conjuncts are, false just when at least one conjunct is; with three truth-values to play with, all other possibilities yield void. 59 It is then a tedious exercise in considering 58 Ibid., p. 35. 59 In terms of bets, the bet on a conjunction is won just when bets on both conjuncts are, and is lost just when a bet on either conjunct is lost. Cf., van Fraassen, op. cit., p. 49. conditional on C is won whenever the bet on B conditional on A is won and the bet on the latter is lost whenever the bet on the former is lost. Given that there is the possibility that a bet is neither won nor lost, this is the natural ordering: other things being equal, a bet on D conditional on C with a positive stake is clearly preferable to a bet on B conditional on A with the same stake when B\A entails D\C. (Negative stakes reverse the order of preference.) There are two other entailment relations that might seem equally viable, corresponding to Belnap's weak implication, and weak implication^. The first requires only that D \ C is true when B \ A is true, the second only that D \ C not be false when B\A is not false. However, the first makes C\A and A&C mutually entailing, despite it being possible to lose a bet on the latter while not losing on the former. The second makes C\A and A z> C mutually entailing, despite it being possible to win a bet on the latter while not winning on the former. Taking conditional assertions to be the objects of conditional bets rules out these alternative entailment relations, a fact which vindicates Edgington's remark about the absence of designated values but not the consequence she draws from it.
the at most sixteen possibilities of truth and falsity for the ordinary events A, B, C, and D to work out that (B\A)&(D\C) always takes the same value as (A&B&C&D)\((A&^B) V (A&C) V (C&-D)),
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The chosen entailment ordering, henceforth designated ^ (reserving h for entailment in classical logic), is obviously reflexive and transitive; moreover if B\A and D\C entail each other, B\A = D\C, so entailment induces a partial order on ^-equivalence classes. If F \ E entails both B \ A and D | C then A, B, C, and D are all true when E and F are true, and E is true, F is false when either A is true and B false or C is true and D false. Therefore, if there should be a conditional event that is true exactly when A, B, C, and D are all true and false exactly when either A is true and B false or C is true and D false, it will certainly be-up to ^-equivalence-the weakest conditional event entailing both B\A and D \ C. That there is such a conditional event is readily established: it is (A&B&C&D)\((A&^B) V (A&C) V (C&^D)). Similarly, we can satisfy the 62 Since on de Finetti's betting scheme stakes may be negative 'winning' a bet may entail losing money. 63 De Finetti [1937], pp. 68-9; cf. idem [1936], p. 36. 64 In rejecting the neither-true-nor-false classification Dummett endorses weak implication^ and with it the identification of conditionals with material implications. Implicitly he rules out the possibility of there being a class of utterances that are the objects of conditional bets.
lattice-or proof-theoretic characterization of disjunction with (B V D) \ ((A&B) V (A&C) V (C&D))
. Given these equivalences we can check that conjunction and disjunction for conditional events are each distributive over the other. Under the entailment relation T | T and 11 T are, respectively, maximal and minimal conditional events unique up to ^-equivalence. Now, it is not difficult to show that, unless A is a classical tautology, B \ A has no complement: i.e. there is no conditional event D\C such that (fi|A)&(D|C) = 11 T and (B | A) V (D | C) = T | T. We must, then, look elsewhere for negation/complementation. Again betting provides the clue: given a bet X, the bet complementary to X is the bet won when X is lost, lost when X is won, and cancelled when X is cancelled; crudely put, it is the bet in which money changes hands in the opposite direction, less crudely, the bet in which bookie and punter exchange roles. So --(Z?|A) is the conditional event true when B\A is false, false when B\A is true, and void when B\A is void: it is ->Z?|A. Clearly Let us extend the entailment relation to allow for multiple premises and say that premises entail conclusion if, and only if, truth of all premises suffices for truth of conclusion and falsity of conclusion suffices for falsity of at least one premise. Entailment by premises is thus identified with entailment by their conjunction. (This conception of entailment coincides with Adams' strong entailment for single-premise arguments but otherwise is less stringent.) Now, if we strictly distinguish between the classical/boolean logico-algebraic operations that may occur within the antecedent and consequent of a conditional event, on the one hand, and, as I have not done, the logico-algebraic operations on conditional events just introduced, on the other, then, focusing on the latter, forgetting about any 'internal structure' that conditional events may have, and appealing to the just-introduced entailment relation, we find van Fraassen has done our work for us: the external logic, as we might say, of conditional events is given by the first-degree entailments of the relevance logic R m j n gie> augmented by a verum or a falsum constant, the former entailed by all, the latter entailing all conditional events/assertions. (Only one of verum and falsum is needed as its negation does the work of the other.)
Bets and probabilities
Before giving details of the three-valued truth-table for iterated conditional events, it is best that we introduce probabilities of conditional events. De 65 Calabrese's conjunction and disjunction-here denoted by n and KJ, respectively, and said by Schay to correspond to the usual meaning of the words 'and' and 'or'-exhibit strange behaviour under the entailment ordering: (C \A) u (X | T) = (A&C) \T ^ C\A d(Az>C)\T =(C|/4)n(X| T). Moreover, neither of the indicated entailments reverses unless A is a classical tautology.
Finetti identies conditional probabilities and probabilities of conditional events:
To introduce the notion of conditional probability means [signifie] extending the definition of PCX) from the field of ordinary events X to the field of conditional events. One then obtains the theorem of compound probabilities.
De Finetti used a Dutch-book argument to show that P{C\A) = P(A&C)/P(A) when P(A) + 0-the theorem of compound probabilities. 67 That is, we have an explanation why the probabilities of conditional events match conditional probabilities, an explanation that follows upon the identification of conditional events as the objects of conditional bets.
In possession now of a principled response to Lewis's challenge, we can go on to show that:
if B\A < D| C,P(A) > 0 and P(C) > 0 then P(B\A) =£ P{D| C). 
< P(B \A) = P(A&B)/[P(A&B) + P(A&^B)] « P(A&B)/[P(A&B) + P(C&-<D)] « P(C&D)/[P(C&D) + P(C&^D)] = P(D | C).
The converse holds to this extent:
if A\h->B, C\hD and B\A •£ D\C then there is a probability distribution P such that P(A) > 0,P(C) > 0, and P(B\A) > P(D\C).
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A simple direct proof may be obtained using mixtures of two-valued probability assignments corresponding to truth-value assignments:
66 , pp. 34-5. 67 See de Finetti [1937] , pp. 68-9. Notice that 'P(C\A)' stands for the probability of the conditional event C\A, not the conditional probability P(CIA). Notice also that the theorem of compound probabilities determines P(C \A) when P(A) =£ 0, but the latter's being non-zero is not a prerequisite for P(C\A)'s having a value. The extension of P from ordinary events to conditional events is thus uniquely determined except for conditional events with antecedents receiving zero probability under P. 68 Stated without proof in Goodman and Nguyen, op. cit., p. 135. For proof they refer the reader to a work that I guess eventually emerged as Goodman, Nguyen, and Walker [ 1991 ] where a proof of this and the converse stated directly below may be recovered from Lemma 2, p. 48, and Theorem 3(iv), p. 200. 69 This is a slight variation on the result stated as Theorem 5 in Goodman and Nguyen [1995] , p.
261. An incomplete proof is given in Calabrese [ 1991 ] , p. 91. The incompleteness is pointed out by the editors of the volume in which it appears; they refer the reader to Chapter 2 of Goodman, Nguyen, and Walker [1991] . Cf. Goodman, Nguyen and Walker [1991] , Lemma 2, p. 48, and Theorem 3(iv), p. 200.
As AW-^B and CM-D there are (two-valued) probability assignments P\ and P 2 such that P X {A) = P X {B) = P 2 (.C) = \ and /^(D) = 0. As B | A •£ D | C then either A&B 1/ C&D or C&^D 1/A&-B, or both. Suppose first that A&B 1/ C&Z) so there is a (two-valued) probability assignment P 3 such that P 3 (A&B) = 1 and P 3 (C&D) = 0. For any *, 0 < x < 1, let P x be *P 2 + (1 -Jc)/*3-Then P X (A) 2= 1 -x > 0, P X (C) & * > 0, P x (£> | C) = 0 and P X (B \A) ^ 1 -x. Suppose next that A&B \-C&D but C&^Dy-A&^B so there is a (two-valued) probability assignment P 4 such that /> 4 (C&-\D) = 1 and ^(A&^B) = 0. For any y, 0 < y < 1, let P y be yP, +(1 -y)P 4 . Then P y (A) &y > 0, P y (C) = 1 (as P,(C) = 1 since p i (A) = P l (B) = 1 and A&B I-C&Z)), P y (O|C) = y and/> y (B|A) = 1.
The limits on validity of the converse cannot be lifted, for
here the entailments do not reverse for all choices of A and B, yet P(± \ T) = P(± |A) = P(± \A&B) = 0 andP(T \A&B) = P(T \A) = P(T | T) = 1 when P(A&B) > 0. Conditional events with necessarily false antecedents are oddities; B\AdiC\L just in case a bet on B conditional on A cannot be won; C|± ~^B\A just in case a bet on B conditional on A cannot be lost. In effect, there is only one unwinnable, unloseable bet. A conditional assertion with a necessarily false antecedent entails and is entailed by every other such conditional assertion including its own negation. To the external logic of conditional events we could add a neuter constant, characterized by the fact that it entails and is entailed by its own negation.
Turning now to iterated conditionals, what of a bet on C \ B conditional on A, where A, B, and C are all ordinary propositions? If A fails to occur the bet is called off. If A occurs the condition A is satisfied so we move on to consider the pay-offs of what is now, in effect, a bet on C | B at the given odds. If B occurs the bet is won or lost as C occurs or not; if B does not occur the bet is called off. The bet on C\B conditional on A therefore pays out in exactly the same circumstances as a bet on C conditional on A&B. Given that conditional bets are bets on conditional assertions we may read this as saying that {C\B)\A~ C\(A&B). De Finetti's three-valued logic for conditional events does indeed render (C\B)\A and C\(A&B) logically equivalent.
On pain of sure loss via a Dutch book (with a side bet against A&B) the odds on the bet on C\B conditional on A and the bet on C conditional on A&B must be the same (as they pay out in the same circumstances). We have established:
Just as de Finetti established for ordinary A and B that P(B | A) = P(A&B)/P(A)
when P(A) # 0, we have shown for ordinary A, B, and C, that P{{C\B)IA) = P(OA&B) when P(A&B) + 0. Reading P((C\B)/A) as P((C\B) \A) we obtain a version of McGee's Import-Export Principle 10 for conditional assertions:
Perhaps more odd, at least at first blush, is de Finetti's identification of C | (B | A) and C | (A&B) but this too falls out of a betting scenario provided we suppose that a conditional bet goes ahead if the conditioning event occurs and is otherwise cancelled.
71 But then a bet on C conditional on B\A goes ahead when, and only when, both A and B are true and is won or lost as C is true or false. As it is cancelled otherwise this bet is won, lost, or cancelled as a bet on C\(A&B) and we obtain the identification. More generally, if, as we have just done, we suppose that a conditional bet goes ahead if the conditioning event occurs and is otherwise cancelled, then a bet on (D\C)\ (B | A), i.e. a bet on D | C conditional on B \A, will go ahead only if A, B, and C occur and is won or lost as D occurs or not. That is, a bet on (D\C)\(B\A) pays out in the same circumstances as a bet on D\A&B&C. We can therefore equate (D\C)\(B\A) and D\A&B&CJ Thus iterated conditional events are readily accommodated within the scheme in a natural manner issuing from the notion of a conditional bet. As a consequence iterated conditional events, no matter how complex the embeddings, always reduce to conditional events with conjunctive antecedents.
We are now in a position to see clearly that de Finetti's account of conditional events via conditional bets has three virtues: (1) it introduces conditional events in such a way as to explain why they are the bearers of conditional probabilities (thus meeting Lewis's challenge); (2) it allows for the imposition of logico-algebraic structure on them in a very natural way; and (3) it allows, again very naturally, the introduction of iterated conditional events within the same framework. I do not say that de Finetti had worked all this out in 1935. It is, in point of fact, implausible to impute to him the lattice-or proof-theoretical approach to denning the connectives & and V by means of the entailment partial ordering, if for no other reason than the undeveloped state of lattice theory in 1935 and the tendency of the time for logics, including many-valued 70 McGee, op. cit., p. 489. 71 The alternative-unremarked by de Finetti-is to suppose that a bet on a conditional event goes ahead provided the conditioning event is not false. So construed, C | (B | -4) and C | (A r> B) ait equivalent. This is Calabrese's stipulation, op. cit., p. 219. 72 We get the same identification if we apply the fundamental understanding of conditional events-beyond its original domain of application-to (D\C)\(B\A), i.e. it is true when B\A and D\C axe, both true, false when B\A is true but D\C false, and otherwise neither true nor false. (Identifying the ordinary events with A | T, our two previous examples (C\B)\A and C\(B\A), emerge as the special cases (C\B)\(A | T) and (C\ T)\(B\A), respectively.) In giving his truth-table for | de Finetti passes no comment on the fact that it allows 'antecedent' and/or 'consequent' to be void although | is introduced as standing only between ordinary events; , pp. 34-5.
logics, to be articulated in terms of their theorems rather than their consequence relations. He himself, as we have seen, spoke of developing three-valued logic in strict analogy with two-valued logic, regarding conditional events as nothing more than formal representations of pairs of ordinary events, which strongly suggests that he did not exploit his own betting perspective as fully as he might have. Only the first of the three virtues can, then, be credited unequivocally to de Finetti. Nevertheless, almost fifty years before the topic came to prominence in artificial intelligence, the germ of a unified treatment of conditional event algebra lies in de Finetti's conception of probabilities as fair betting quotients and conditional events as the objects of conditional bets. We should also note that B : A contains all conjunctions and disjunctions of its members and that its members are those events whose occurrence suffice in the presence of A for winning a bet on B conditional on A. Consequently, their negations are exactly those events sufficient-in the presence of A-for loss of that bet and hence for winning the bet on ->B conditional on A.
The case of conjunction is more complex. We begin by noting that on the basis of any set R whose members are partially ordered by ^ we can construct the class 91 of intervals of R, i.e. subsets of/? of the form {uE R: If the partial order ^ on R is such that meets exist for every pair of elements in R, then given any two intervals S and T we can form the set S A T = {s A t: sGS,tET}. Clearly, if u £ S A T then 5, A /, < u r< s 2 A t 2 . If not only meets exist for every pair of elements in R but also joins and, moreover, meets and joins form a distributive lattice, then 5 A 7" is an interval: Given the operation A on !R, we can define the partial order =s" on intervals:
5 =s" T if, and only if, 5 A T = S.
Two facts readily emerge after a little light algebra: (1) the partial order =s" coincides with the natural partial order =£ on 91; (2) A is the meet operation on pairs of intervals relative to the natural partial order. Now, when ^ is the partial order on a boolean algebra B given by In the search for a conditional (defined on conditional events and itself yielding a conditional event) that obeys modus ponens we might look to residuation. That is, we might stipulate that B|A=> D\C = sup{F|£ GB\B:B\A&F\E =< D\C} when the latter exists and is otherwise undefined, the supremum (least upper bound), if it exists, being taken with respect to the order ^ on B | B. Now, any conditional event F\E in the set [F\E £ B\B:B\A&F\E <D\C) must satisfy these conditions: (i) when B\A is true and D\C is not then neither is Given the conditional =>, we can introduce an intuitionist-style negation
This turns out to be equivalent to A&--B| T and so ~ ~ (B| A) = A 3 B \ T, i.e. with this new negation the double negation of a conditional assertion is the corresponding classical material conditional. Also, for all A and B, ~(Z?|A)V , p. 35.
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76 In technical jargon, ~ is a pseudo-complement and => is a relative pseudo-complement. For the negation see Walker [1991], pp. 121-3, and Walker [1991] , p. 113. On relative pseudo-complements see Goodman, Nguyen, and Walker, op. cit., pp. 241-4, and Walker [1994] , p. 1703.
Where ~'(B\A) is the negation previously introduced, i.e. -'B\A, we have that ~(B\A)d-<(B\A). As a special case, ~(A|±) = 11 T <-<A\± « A\±.
We also have that - Consequently, just as van Fraassen showed us that with de Finetti's conjunction, disjunction and negation the fragment R M Q of R m j ng ie comprising its firstdegree entailments is the external logic of conditional events, so we now find 77 Cf. Goodman, Nguyen, and Walker [1991], pp. 204-5. 78 Introduced in Godel [1932] . Irrespective of any underlying structure such as is present in the case of conditional events, it can be shown that in the context of three-valued logic the Godel conditional is the only truth-functional conditional for which the familar introduction and elimination rules-conditional proof and modus ponens-are sound with respect to transmission of the maximum value from premises to conclusion and retransmission of the minimum value from conclusion to at least one premise (provided the standard rules for the introduction and elimination of conjunctions are also sound in this way). See e.g. Milne [1991] , pp. 36-9. 79 See Troelstra [1986] or van Dalen [1986] , Theorem 5.5.1, pp. 279-80. This logic is sound and complete with respect to Kripke models for intuitionist logic restricted so as to contain exactly one branch with two nodes. This logic is therefore the minimum departure from classical logic that can be captured in Kripke semantics.
that when negation and a conditional are defined proof-or lattice-theoretically as above in terms of the betting partial order on conditional events, the external logic is Godel's three-valued logic. If you throw both switch S and switch T, the motor will start. Therefore, either if you throw switch 5 the motor will start, or if you throw switch T the motor will start.
Unwelcome as this may be, matters are nowhere near as bad as with the 80 Milne [1996] , pp. 130-2. 81 Because-and, as Milne ibid., Theorem 3, pp. 130-1 shows, only because-the conditional assertion C | A need not be necessarily true when the corresponding material conditional -v4 v C is, conditional assertions avoid collapsing to material conditionals despite being factual in the sense just introduced. For C | A to be necessarily true both A and C must be classical tautologies. 82 On which see Adams [1965 ], pp. 167, 182, Armstrong [1969 
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This, however, supplies only limited comfort in the face of the switches paradox in view of the fact that
and so the event on the right-hand side cannot be false.
Probability
(a) While Godel's three-valued logic is a very strong intermediate logic it is not classical, as the failure of (B\A) to entail B\A when A is not a tautology shows. This gap between (B\A) and B\A finds succinct manifestation when probabilities are assigned:
So the difference is probability between a conditional event and its double negation is just the differences between the conditional probability and the probability of the corresponding material conditional. When
, which is a positive quantity unless P(A) = 1 or P(B/A) = 1, an excess apparently first noted by Popper (see Dorn [1992/93] ). That there should be this gap is, of course, vital to the project of identifying conditional assertions/events as the bearers of conditional probabilities.
so, relative to the 'external' conjunction defined on conditional events, a conditional assertion/event is probabilistically independent of its antecedent. if, and only if, P(C\A) = 0 or P(A) = 1. Taking A for C, we have that if P(A) > 0 then P(A) = 1, i.e. additivity requires that P be two-valued on ordinary propositions/events. Since this.need not be the case, additivity fails. Goodman and Nguyen assert that the induced probability distribution on conditional events is 'neither additive nor subadditive for conditional objects with different antecedents '. 84 This is either hair-splitting of a high order or a missed opportunity. What we find is that:
if ( A |~v4) ) is formally unconstrained, although P(A | A) = P(-'AI-'A) = 1. But this is as it should be, for as conditional events or assertions A | A and ->A \ -•A cannot both be true (albeit that it must be that one is true and the other neither true nor false). In similar fashion when P(A&C) = 0, P((B\A) V (D\C)) = 1 unless P(A&B) = P(C&D) = 0, as happens when P(B\A) = P{D\C) = 0, in which case the probability of the disjunction is formally unconstrained. For example, /'((-•A|A)V(A|-"A)) is formally unconstrained, although P(-v4|A) = f(A|-'A) = 0. Although neither ->A|A nor A|-A can be true it is also the case that they cannot both be false. Incidentally, the first example above confirms Adams' assertion that there cannot be a genuine conjunction for conditional events that is sound with respect to his high-probability criterion of validity. Certainly, as the example shows, the entailment relation d-that we obtained from conditional bets yields none.
A defence
In company with the switches paradox the results of 4.2 (c) suggest that, despite being well founded on considerations concerning conditional bets, conjunction and disjunction of conditional assertions/events is a much less straightforward affair than it seems on first acquaintance. To return to the opening quotation from Quine, the everyday attitudes that appear to endorse the conditional assertion analysis of conditionals also seem to balk at consequences of that analysis. Now, it might be objected that these consequences are not compelled by that analysis, for one is not forced to define conjunctions and disjunctions in the way de Finetti does, and this, I admit, is so. Nevertheless, on the one hand the case for the de Finetti-Goodman-Nguyen definitions is very strong, and on the other failure to adopt them leads to consequences even more unpalatable than those of sections 4.1 (c) and 4.2 (c). Let us take these claims in turn.
Standardly, valid inference preserves truth, but preservation of truth alone fails to rule out the logical equivalence of A&B\ T and B\A; plausibly, valid inference also preserves non-falsity, but preservation of non-falsity alone fails to rule out the logical equivalence of Az>Z?|T and B\A. As these pairs comprise, in each case, distinguishable conditional assertions, it seems that we need a notion of entailment at least as strong as both preservation of truth and preservation of non-falsity when we consider inferences with a single premise. Identifying entailment with transmission of truth and retransmission of falsity exactly matches the ordering derived from betting considerations. And although this is ultimately not a different justification, we might note that the ordering d-on conditional assertions can be characterized purely probabilistically:
B \A =< D | C if, and only if, for all probability assignments P, P(A&B) =s
P(C&D) and P(C&^D) =S P(A&-B).
This ordering can also be arrived at another way. By Goodman, Nguyen, and Walker's representation theorem any plausible candidates to be the bearers of conditional probability can be represented as quotient sets generated by principal ideals. These are just interval sets and the natural induced partial ordering on these interval sets coincides with the betting order. Thus this ordering seems to have a canonical status.
Relative to this canonical ordering the de Finetti-Goodman-Nguyen conjunction and disjunction are the canonical logico-algebraic lattice-and/or proof-theoretic operations. Moreover, as a further witness to their canonical status we should take note of Walker's result: and that under no probability distribution is a conjunction more probable than its conjuncts and a disjunction less probable than its disjuncts (when these probabilities are determined by the probabilities of ordinary propositions), then de Finetti-Goodman-Nguyen conjunction and disjunction are the only ones possible.
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So turning one's back on the de Finetti-Goodman-Nguyen conjunction and disjunction means rejecting some very strong intuitions about the behaviour of these logical operations.
Suppose that, nevertheless, we do contemplate rejecting these connectives. We should note that, given the canonical partial order,. the de FinettiGoodman-Nguyen conjunction is the weakest candidate conjunction to entail its conjuncts and, likewise, the disjunction is the strongest candidate disjunction to be entailed by its disjuncts. As is shown by inspection, given the role conjunctions and disjunctions play in them, any other conjunction that entails its conjuncts and any other disjunction entailed by its disjuncts provides no escape from the examples in sections 4.1 (c) and 4.2 (c). To avoid these unwelcome consequences one is therefore driven either to reject the canonical ordering on conditional assertions or to adopt as the proper conceptions of conjunction and disjunction for conditional assertions either a 'conjunction' that does not entail both its conjuncts or a 'disjunction' not entailed by at least one of its disjuncts-or both-and this involves making the case that the connectives adopted do indeed qualify as, respectively, a conjunction and a disjunction.
Finally, notice that the problematic findings concern inferences with only a single premise-or, more generally, relations between pairs of conditional assertions-so even if one does not accept the general criterion of validity of inference proposed above, namely entailment by premises being identified with entailment by their conjunction, as long as any alternative coincides with the canonical ordering ^ on single premise inferences (as Adams' strong entailment does) no escape is afforded.
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